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8 Beyond the Berle and Means paradigm: 
private equity and the new capitalist order 
Stephen F. Diamond 
I Introduction 
The collapse of the credit markets that began to roil the global financial 
system in the late summer of 2007 hit more than just the homebuilding 
and mortgage sectors of the economy. As interest rates increased, pri­
vate equity, or "PE," an important new form of financial capital, also 
felt the shockwave. PE funds have grown substantially in size as well as 
in political and financial significance in the last decade. The Blackstone 
Group, for example, one of a handful of top tier PE funds, took over the 
Hilton Hotels Corporation for $26 biJIion in 2007. Cerberus Capital, 
another major PE player, surprised many when it announced plans to 
buy the troubled Chrysler Group from DaimlerChrysler - a pioneering 
venture into the tOP ranks of industrial United States. 
KKR, one of the oldest PE funds, currently owns such a large 
number of independent businesses that it is, indirectly, the second 
largest employer in the United States with 560,000 employees, twice 
as many as GM, ahead of MacDonald's and just behind Wal-Mart. 
Today's PE fund managers have been hailed widely in the business 
press as the new "masters of the universe," pushing aside bond traders 
and investment bankers, not to mention lowly CEOs. The managers 
of the largest funds are billionaires. Henry Kravis, the second "K" 
in KKR, has a wing named after him at New York's Metropolitan 
Museum of Art. 
Since the credit freeze, however, the major banks that had made bil­
lions in loans to PE funds to finance their leveraged buyouts ("LBOs") 
of companies like Chrysler, Clear Channel or the UK's Alliance Boots 
retail pharmacy giant, have been unable to re-sell those loans into the 
wider capital markets, thus drying up the liquidity upon which PE 
funds depend. In turn this caused the critical flow of capital to PE 
funds to seize up, leading some to predict a quick end to the recent 
"LBO boom.�' The Financial Times wondered whether PE might turn 
out to be "a cyclical phenomenon of finite duration and questionable 
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wisdom.'" Indeed, Bloomberg News concluded: "Private-equity firms 
have been hunkered down since the onset of the credit crisis about 16 
months ago, scarred by broken deals and frustrated by the evaporation 
of debt financing crucial to buyoutS."2 
These difficulties contributed to another problem for private equity. 
In order to raise more capital and gain currency to finance expansion, 
several private buyout funds, ironically, turned to the stock market 
themselves, "going public" by selling a small percentage of their man­
agement firms to outside investors. Most prominently, the Blackstone 
Group went public in 2007 at a price of $31 a share in order to raise 
$4 billion for its partners and for expansion. The initial public offer­
ing (IPO) placed a value on Blackstone of more than $33 billion. But 
within a few weeks the fear of a credit crunch and possible tax hikes 
caused the price of Blackstone shares to drop 22 percent, making it the 
worst performing IPO of 2007. In addition, investor advocacy groups 
including the AFL-CIO complained about the opaque governance 
structure that Blackstone used to shield its business operations from 
scrutiny by its new shareholders.' The structure seemed designed to 
avoid the oversight provisions of the federal Investment Company Act, 
put in place in the New Deal era as a firewall to protect investors from 
speculative activity by investment firms such as buyout funds. In other 
words, Blackstone was recreating within its own firm the very separ­
ation of ownership and control that it attempts to eliminate when it 
buys out other corporations. Other major PE funds that had planned to 
follow Blackstone's lead into the public markets began to have second 
thoughts. 
Despite the downturn, however, cash has continued to flow to PE 
funds. At the end of the summer in 2007, according to the Wall Street 
Journal, Blackstone announced it had raised the largest buyout fund 
in history "despite the recent red flags in the debt markets," raising 
a total of $21.7 billion. This included a $1 billion commitment from 
the California State Teachers' Retirement System "along with a host 
of other big public pension funds.'" This was soon followed by an 
announcement by the Carlyle Group in early September that it had 
successfully raised 5.3 billion euros for its European based buyout 
operations. The pace in 200S indeed slowed, but fundraising secured 
I «The End of LBOs," Financial Times, July 27, 2007. 
2 Jason Kelly, "Paulson's Capital May Bring Blackstone, Carlyle Back," Bloomberg, 
October 17, 2008. 
, This author advised the AFL-CIO on concerns with regard to the Blackstone IPO. 
4 Laura Kreutzer, "Blackstone Closes Record Buyout Fund," Wall StreetJournal, August 
8,2007. 
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slightly more than $100 billion in the first nine months of the year 
relative to the $l1S billion raised in the same period the year before.' 
In 2009, KKR led the IPO of one of its portfolio companies, the semi­
conductor firm Avago, raising $650 million.' KKR increased its over­
all return by acting as deal manager and underwriter simultaneously. 
It also completed a second IPO of Dollar General in 2009, a discount 
retailer that KKR took private in a $7.2 billion LBO in 2007. That 
deal generated a $239 million dividend for KKR and its partners. '  By 
acting as co-lead underwriters with Goldman Sachs and Citigroup, 
KKR also shared in the $64 million transaction fees generated by·the 
deal.' KKR had originally put in some $2.S billion of its own money to 
take the company private and that stake was valued in advance of the 
IPO at about $4.75 billion, "indicating a windfall for KKR," accord­
ing to the Wall Street Journal.' Meanwhile, Blackstone founder Stephen 
Schwarzman told an investors' conference in October 2008 that "the 
best returns in private equity have come in a period like the one that 
we're just entering. This is an absolutely wonderful time."lo By mid-
2010, "private equity firms . . .  sit atop an estimated $500 billion" in 
cash that has been raised from pension funds, endowments and foreign 
governments. II 
This chapter will assume that, in fact, private equity as an institu­
tional form is here to stay. More significantly, I will argue that private 
equity attempts to solve one of the perennial problems long associated 
with the Anglo-American form of capitalism, the separation of owner­
ship and control. The resolution of this issue now takes on even greater 
importance with the collapse, at least for the time being, of the invest­
ment banking model that has long been at the heart of modern finan­
cial capitalism. As I argued recently in a paper with economist Jennifer 
5 "PE Fund-Raising Still Going Strong. Buyout Shops, Not So Much," Wall Street 
Journal, October 7, 2008. Although fund-raising and deal flow were down signifi­
cantly in late 2008, nonetheless PE funds had some $2.5 trillion under management 
at the end of2008. Marko Maslakovic, Private Equity 2009, IFSL Research, London, 
August 2009. 
6 Peter Lattman, "KKR Affiliate Sees Value Increase, Strong Performance Comes as 
Buyout Firm Prepares for Its Own Listing," Wall Street Journal, August 19, 2009, 
p. C3. 
7 C. Thomas Keegel, International Sec'y-Treas., Int'l. Bro. Teamsters, Letter to 
Duncan Niederaurer and Richard Ketchum, June 16, 2010. 
S Ibid. 
9 Peter Lattman, "KKR To Stage IPO of Dollar General," Wall Street Journal, August 
21, 2009, p. B4. 
10 Kelly, "Paulson'S Capital." 
II Julie Creswell, "On Wall Street, So Much Cash, So Little Time," The New York Times, 
June 24, 2010, p. 5 
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Kuan,12 the hidden infrastructure established by investment banks on 
the regulated stock exchanges was a critical backstop to policing the 
problems caused by the separation of ownership and control. With that 
infrastructure now seriously damaged, the future health of capitalism 
will depend on the emergence of new forms of oversight and manage­
ment of the issues that inherently plague financial capital. 
A cautionary note is in order: I come forward neither to praise Caesar 
nor to bury him. This chapter is an attempt to assess this critical insti­
tutional player so that the current playing field of global capitalism can 
be better understood. As a critical supporter of corporate social respon­
sibility efforts such as those proposed by the international labor move­
ment" and European social democratic parties, it is important to have 
a clear understanding of the nature of the institutions that dominate 
our economy and that I believe will be, in some form, a key part of the 
response to the current crisis. 
The chapter will proceed in five parts. First, I will attempt to describe 
the world as managers of private equity funds as well as some of their 
critics see it. Second, I will summarize the structure and mechanics of 
PE funds, including the importance of leverage to their success. Third, 
I will discuss what I have referred to here as the separation of ownership 
and control problem, including its modern formulation as an ((agency" 
problem, firSt clearly formulated by Berle and Means. Fourth, I will 
critically assess the "counter-attack" on PE funds from labor and the 
left, which I believe is wrongly rooted in the concept of "financializa­
tion." I will conclude with an attempt to summarize what I consider to 
be the "real" nature of private equity. 
II PE's worldview 
PE fund managers argue that they offer a potential solution to what 
many have long argued is the core problem of the modern corpor­
ation: the ability of insiders of public companies to take advantage of 
outside shareholders. This tension between corporate managers and 
public investors has become a key factor in post-Enron debates about 
lZ Stephen Diamond and Jennifer Kuan, "Ringing the Bell on the NYSE: Might a 
Nonprofit Stock Exchange Have Been Efficient?" (2007) 9 Duquesne Business Law 
Journal!. 
13 The leading advocate for reform of the private equity sector in the international labor 
movement has been the International Union of Foodworkers, a global labor umbrella 
group based in Geneva. See www.iuf.orglbuyoutwatch (last accessed February 22, 
2011). The substance of my critique of the limitations of the labor attack on PE will 
become clear in the chapte�. 
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corporate governance and finance on Wall Street and in Washington, 
DC. The labor movement is playing a crucial role in these debates 
through traditional lobbying but also through its newly established 
shareholder activism programs at the AFL-CIO and the breakaway 
group "Change to Win" and at several major union affiliates such as 
AFSCME, the Teamsters and SEIU. These and other critics of corpor­
ate behavior argue that the "jinanciaZization" of the modern economy 
lies behind the distorted behavior of corporations. But this is a mis­
guided view of modern capitalism and largely irrelevant to an assess­
ment of PE funds. For the new corporate responsibility movement to 
reach its full potential, a new approach is required. 
Typically, PE funds take companies private by buying up the publicly 
traded stock of a target firm and, arguably, because of their complete 
control of the company, they can then more effectively deploy firm assets 
to productive and profitable uses.l4 After an LBO, the senior inside 
managers have one boss - the PE fund - to whom they must respond 
rather than thousands of dispersed public shareholders. This appears 
to allow firms to act more decisively. For example, Robert Nardelli, the 
controversial new CEO of the auto giant Chrysler, which was taken 
over by Cerberus Capital, told the New York Times that the company 
has "become more nimble" and that a new slogan at the company is 
being used to describe decision-making: "Either a yes or a no but not a 
slow maybe." Thus, a recent decision on cutting production was made 
in "several minutes/' he said, while it would have taken months at a 
publicly traded firm.15 
Once a firm's managers have generated the benefits from this new 
decisiveness and flexibility, the PE fund will eventually re-sell the tar­
get firm to another private owner or back to the public in an initial 
public offering (or "IPO") of their common stock. These re-sales can 
generate huge profits for the PE funds' professional staff, outside inves­
tors and the managerial teams put in place at the target firm. Jay Ritter 
calculates that over a twenty-year period some 666 companies with 
annual revenues at or above $50 million generated three-year buy and 
hold returns of more than 45 percent for buyout fund backed IPOS.16 
14 The large buyout funds such as Blackstone and KKR are now diversified alternative 
asset managers engaged in a range of businesses in addition to the traditional corporate 
buyout market. A discussion of this diversification is outside the scope of this chapter. 
15 Associated Press, "Chrysler CEO Pleased With Labor Contract," in The New York 
Times, October 30,2007. Of course, the Chrysler buyout hit huge headwinds with the 
recession that followed the credit collapse. 
16 Jay Ritter, "Some Factoids About the 2007 IPO Market - Long-run Returns," 
available at: http://bear.cba.ufl..edulritter (last accessed February 22, 2011). Market 
adjusted and style adjusted returns are lower. 
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PE funds also find ways to generate returns when the IPO window is 
closed. In a recent, albeit extreme, example, the $4.3 billion buyout of 
British company Travelport, owner of the online. travel website Orbitz, 
returned 100 percent of the $1 billion in equity invested in the company 
by its new PE owners, Blackstone and Technology Crossover Ventures, 
in less than a year. The firm used a new technique called a "dividend 
recapitalization" - it borrowed more money once taken over and issued 
that borrowed money as a dividend to the PE funds. Of course, that 
rewards the PE fund and its limited partners by increasing the debt 
burden weighing on the target company. 
At the large UK clothing retailer Debenhams, some £2 billion (1.4 
billion in debt and 600 million in equity) was used by a consortium of 
private equity firms including CVC, TPG and Merrill Lynch Private 
Equity to take over the company. A dividend recapitalization yielded £1. 2 
billion to the three firms, a 200 percent return on their original equity, 
and that waS followed by a profitable IPO. According to the Financial 
Times: "Merrill - along with the other buy-out firms - has made a hand­
some return on the investment regardless of the share price performance 
following the float. The three private equity firms made more than three 
times their collective initial £600m equity investment in less than three 
years."17 In a discussion over whether the Debenhams deal was a "flip" 
or "flop" the Financial Times explained their profit calculations: 
While the exact profits from the deal have never been disclosed, the FT has 
calculated that TPG invested about [250m and made an estimated return of 
£675m, excluding the 14 per cent stake it kept after the flotation. eve put in 
about £215m and made close to £580m with a 9.7 per cent stake, while Merrill 
Lynch Private Equity invested £135m to earn about £365m and an 8.5 per 
cent stake. Staff are thought to have made close to £50m from their 4 per cent 
stake. John Lovering, Rob Templeman and Chris Woodhouse, Debenhams' top 
executive team, made estimated profits of £21m, £41m and £41m respectively 
and retained combined stakes worth about £60m at the time of the float.18 
Whether the restructuring put in place at such companies is rational 
or destructive is a hotly debated issue. Travelport laid off hundreds 
of workers in its first year under new private ownership but contends 
it has both hired hundreds of new workers (no doubt at much lower 
wages), and invested heavily in new technology. Although cash flow 
improved, cost-cutting and real estate sell-offs were blamed, in part, 
17 "Debenham's Shares Tumble over Merrill's Departure from Buy-out?" Financial 
Times, March 27, 2008. 
18 "Debenham's _ Flip or Flop?" Financial Times AlphaviUe Blog, August 6, 2007, on file 
with the author. 
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for the poor performance of Deb en hams after its re-listing. At Chrysler 
PE decisiveness was used to pressure the United Auto Workers union 
into unprecedented concessions that led to a dramatic downsizing of 
the workforce as well as huge wage cuts. The ratification vote of a new 
collective bargaining agreement by union members was very close, with 
opposition led by one of the UAW's own lead negotiators, Bill Parker, 
head of a large Chrysler union 10cal.l9 CEO Nardelli, however, called 
the agreement "revolutionary" claiming it is "a major step forward" to 
restoring the company's competitiveness.2o 
What is not at issue, however, is that PE funds mark a potentially dra­
matic change in the ownership structure of US businesses with import­
ant implications for labor and society as a whole. Yet the reaction to this 
development varies widely across the left and the trade union move­
ment. Some view the emergence of PE funds as a source of new prof­
itability for labor managed pension funds, while others argue that the 
funds represent another step in the emerging dominance of "financial" 
capital that undermines job security and union power. 
The arrival of a potentially new stage in the history of capitalism is, 
without doubt, an unusual and perhaps perplexing event. The last such 
moment was marked seventy-five years ago by the publication of The 
Modern Corporation and Private Property in 1932 by legal scholar Adolf 
Berle and economist Gardiner Means.21 Their book is now recognized 
as a critical, if flawed,22 study of the publicly traded corporation, which 
was then still a relatively new and little understood institution. Their 
analysis of the potential tension between inside managers and outside 
investors remains relevant to the dysfunction that, to this day, often 
can plague the public corporation. Berle and Means argued that when 
corporations sell shares to the wider public it enables the firm's inside 
managers to control the day-to-day operations of the business, often 
taking advantage of that privileged position to enrich themselves at the 
expense of outside investors. Now, seventy-five years later, it appears 
that PE funds offer a different approach to managing businesses, def­
initely still capitalist but distinct from the Berle-Means paradigm 
firm with its separation between ownership and control. Because PE 
funds close the gap between ownership and control they presumably 
19 Tiffany Ten Eyck and Chris Kutalik, "Oppositio.n Swells Against Concessionary 
Auto Contracts," Labor Notes, December 14, 2007. 
20 Associated Press, "Chrysler CEO Pleased." 
21 Adolph A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(New York: Commerce Clearing House, 1932; 1991). 
22 Clifford Holderness, "The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States" (2009) 
22 Review of Financial Studies 1377. 
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eliminate the damage that gap can generate. Thus, PE funds mobilize 
hundreds of billions of dollars in the capital markets with the purpose, 
it is argued, of resolving the failings of public corporations that EerIe 
and Means first identified 
III How do private equity funds work? 
Ey what alchemy of financial engineering or corporate restructuring do 
PE funds carty out their magic? Private equity is a subset of a larger div­
ision within the financial world called "alternative assets." Alternative 
assets typically are defined to include private equity funds, hedge funds 
and real estate funds. Over the last twenty years large institutional 
investors such as pension funds, insurance companies, foundations 
and university endowments have turned to this asset class as a means 
to diversify away from the lower average returns found in traditional 
stocks and bonds. Until the late 1970s the fiduciary standards applied 
to pension funds and other large institutional pools of capital required 
them to stick largely to what were then considered secure investments 
such as bonds. However, financial theorists began to argue that diver­
sification across a wider range of assets could allow investors to secure 
greater returns without necessarily taking on too much risk. Soon, trus­
tees of pension funds were allowed to move out of bonds, first into the 
larger equity markets and then into newly emerging "alternative asset" 
classes like PE funds. In fact, to fail to make such investments was soon 
viewed as, potentially, a violation of a trustee's fiduciary duty to maxi­
mize a fund's returns. 
Some large institutions now allocate as much as 20 or 30 percent 
of their assets to alternative investments. In fact, public sector pen­
sion funds, including those jointly managed with union representatives, 
are among the largest and most important investors in buyout funds. 
The Oregon Investment Council, which manages that state's public 
employees pension fund, began investing in KKR as early as 1980. 
The California Public Employees Retirement System (CaIPERS), the 
nation's largest institutional investor, has approximately $240 billion 
under management on behalf of 1.5 million current and future retired 
public employees. Currently, it allocates more than $42 billion of its 
assets, or about 24 percent, to alternative investment and real estate 
funds, including buyout funds, venture capital and hedge funds.23 
Together, California, Oregon and Washington public sector pension 
23 Asset Allocation, CalPERS at www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc;::;/investments/assets/ 
assetallocation.xml (last accessed February 22, 2011). 
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plans have invested more than $50 billion in private equity alone in the 
last decade.24 
The subset of private equity itself consists of several different types of 
funds including buyout funds (the class that includes KKR, Blackstone, 
Carlyle and others), venture capital funds, mezzanine funds and dis­
tressed securities. Each has a different investment strategy but they 
share certain basic characteristics. They are aU typicaUy structured 
as ((limited partnerships," where a general partner raises money from 
investors who wiU be limited partners, or "LPs," of the fund. The gen­
eral partner, or "GP," then manages the money raised, usually through 
a separate management company, choosing where to invest and how to 
best monitor those investments. The LPs have only a "limited" role in 
the day-to-day life of the fund, waiting, instead, patiently for an eventual 
return of their investment, hopefully with a significant profit. In return 
for the sacrifice of active oversight, the LPs gain limited liability pro­
tection - liable only for losses up to the value of their investment in the 
fund. By definition LPs must be large institutional players or wealthy 
individuals because the GP will raise the money for the fund through 
a "private" placement where the LP interests being sold will not be 
accompanied by the disclosure of information that public corporations 
provide their shareholders. The LPs are thought to be capable, in the 
words of the US Supreme Court, of "fending for themselves" without 
the disclosure requirements applied by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission to public companies.25 
The magic of leverage 
To better understand the potential returns a private equity fund can gen­
erate, consider a hypothetical example: Private Equity Fund I, or "PEF 
I," which proposes to raise a relatively smaU fund, perhaps $100 million, 
to engage in "leveraged buyouts." The general partner of PEF I will pre­
pare an offering memorandum providing basic information to potential 
LPs about the background of the professionals that work for the GP, as 
weU as a description of the fund's proposed investment strategy. Assume 
that ten LPs will each invest $10 million in the fund. Unlike a mutual 
fund or a hedge fund, the money that the LPs invest is committed at 
the time the fund is legaUy established, caUed the "close" of the fund, 
but it will not yet be actuaUy invested. As the GP decide's on investment 
24 Jason Kelly and Jonathan Keehner, "Pension Plans' Private Equity Cash Depleted as 
Profits Sink," Bloomberg News, August 20, 2009. 
25 SECv. Ralston Purina, 346 US 119 (1953). 
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targets it will issue a "capital call" to the LPs who then will turn over 
the requisite percentage of their prior cash commitment. However, the 
G P  will need operating capital from the start-up of PEF I so it receives, 
typically, a 2 percent management fee annually from the LPs. Thus, for 
a relatively small $100 million fund, the G P  will receive $2 million per 
year to pay the salaries of its professional staff.26 The management fee is 
paid even if the fund does not actually make any investments, although 
that is relatively rare. Most funds are set up to last for ten years but most 
of the $100 million is likely to be "called" and invested within three or 
four years of the start of the fund. Z7 Then, the money is put to work and 
the LPs wait for an "exit" when the G P  decides to liquidate an invest­
ment and pay off the LPs. 
For a leveraged buyout, or "LBO," fund, the G P  typically looks for 
"undervalued" publicly traded corporations that can be bought with the 
funds invested by the LPs but with the added leverage of debt borrowed 
through commercial and investment banks. The meaning of "under­
valued" can vary from fund manager to fund manager, but usually it 
means that the G P's analysis of the available public information about 
the target company indicates that with certain changes in the way the 
company is managed its value could be increased significantly. The basis 
of that conclusion, of course, is proprietary. The managers of PEF I will 
offer the target's current public shareholders a price that is usually at a· 
significant premium to the current market price but not as high as the 
G P  thinks it is potentially worth. In theory, the current shareholders will 
accept because they are unable to earn the same return with the existing 
management. 
In fact, this financial strategy is of central importance to those sup­
porters of "agency theory" who carry on the work begun by Berle and 
Means in the 1930s. This kind of takeoveris part of the "market for cor­
porate control" that is thought to force managers of companies either to 
run them profitably on behalf of shareholders or face a potential take­
over by buyout funds like PEF 1. To carry out an acquisition on the 
scale of the $26 billion takeover of Hilton Hotels by Blackstone, how­
ever, requires far greater resources than even the largest funds, which 
26 PE league tables indicate that the top fifty funds raised $810 billion between 2003 
and 2008, with the lowest amount $5.9 billion and the highest, $32 billion. Private 
Equity International, PEl 50 (2008). 
27 The cal1 represents, in theory, a monitoring device for the protection of the LPs. If 
an investor is not happy about the fund's performance or management there is an 
opportunity for exit. However� tightly negotiated investment agreements as well as 
the potential reputation effect limit severely the opportunity for early LP exit. Thus, 
ironically� there remains a potential agency problem inside the fund itself even as it 
tries to address that problem in its target firms. 
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now can run to more than ten billion dollars, can raise directly from 
LPs. Hence the concept of leverage: once it has its initial $100 million 
committed by the ten LPs, our PEF I will identify buyout targets and 
then turn to commercial and investment banks to raise additional funds 
to follow through on its acquisition strategy. These funds are usually 
raised initially as bridge loans from banks which are in turn sold off to 
investors in the wider capital markets. These loans look very much like 
the bonds offered by large public companies - they are so-called "fixed 
income" instruments with an interest payment due every six months. 
Because there is somewhat greater risk associated with many of these 
transactions than in the bonds issued by, for example, traditional invest­
ment grade companies like G E, that interest rate can be relatively high. 
Many of these bonds are so-called "junk" bonds, the very same type 
of instrument made famous by Michael Milken in the 1980s, although 
they are now called, euphemistically, "high yield debt." 
Assuming the availability of $500 billion committed to buyout funds 
in the United States currently and a potential 4:1 leverage ratio, the sec­
tor can wield $2.5 trillion to search for corporate targets. This capital 
base competes for investment opportunities with several other major 
players, including the $2 trillion sitting in hedge funds, zs the approxi­
mate $4 trillion in sovereign wealth funds of major governmentsZ' and 
a relatively small $250 billion in venture capital. 30 One way to consider 
the potential socio-economic impact of buyout funds is to compare the 
$2.5 trillion figure with the value of the sector's potential targets. The 
market capitalization - the total value of outstanding shares at the cur­
rent price - of US publicly traded companies on the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ is approximately $15 trillion." Thus, in the­
ory, at current levels the buyout sector could take over more than 13 
percent of all publicly traded companies. In fact, to make good on the 
promises to its LP investors, PE funds must engage in something close to 
that volume of takeovers or else it must release its LPs from their capital 
commitments - something that LPs are not likely to be pleased about. 
While that percentage may seem low, the existence of LBO funds of 
this magnitUde affects many more companies than those that become 
actual targets. In theory, every public company is a potential target and 
thus must take measures to improve share prices to avoid a takeover. 
28 Bei Hu, "Hedge Fund Assets to Hit $2 Trillion by Year-End, Survey Says," Bloomberg/ 
Business Week, April 6, 2010. 
29 IFSL Research, Sovereign Wealth Funds 2010, March 2010. 
30 National Venture Capital Association at www.nvca.org (last visited June 30, 2010). 
31 World Federation of Exchanges, 2009 Market Highlights at www.world-exchanges. 
org/statistics (last accessed February 22, 2011). 
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Thus, all public companies are under pressure to engage in the kinds of 
aggressive restructurings that an LBO fund would carry out. 
L everage, of course, also helps magnify the returns to the fund 
because the interest on the debt raised through the banks is fixed. 
Therefore, as long as the rate of return on the capital used to buy out 
target companies is higher than that interest rate the fund is earning 
free cash flow. If our hypothetical PEF I can leverage itself 4:1 and raise 
another $400 million through its banks, then it will be in a position to 
command $500 million. Then the GP can begin its search for appropri­
ate targets, buying them up usually through "friendly" deals negotiated 
with the current management team, although so-called "hostile" tender 
offers made directly to the shareholders of targets are possible as well." 
After restructuring the company in a manner that the GP believes will 
increase its profitability, the GP will look for an "exit" opportunity. 
This usually means returning to the public capital markets and selling 
shares in the company back to the public, at a price far higher than was 
paid to take the company private. Alternatively, and today often a more 
common tactic, is a so-called «trade" sale where the company is sold to 
another corporation for either cash or shares in the new company. 
For a buyout fund the 2 percent annual management fee is attract­
ive and can be quite important in lean times but it is nOt "real money." 
The real money for the GP is in the "carried interest," or "carry." 
Buyout funds typically receive 20 percent of the returns to the fund 
above the initial investment by the LPs. So, let's say PEF I uses its 
$500 million war chest to buy a small auto parts company in Ohio. If 
the market had valued the company at $400 million, then PEF I will 
have bought out the existing shareholders at a 25 percent premium. 
Now the GP ofPEF I must find a way to increase the value of the com­
pany. They might do it by "slashing and burning" - laying off workers, 
moving plants to Mexico or China; or they might do it by renegoti­
ating labor contracts with the company's unions that in turn allows 
,2 Many deals in the first wave of LBOs in the late 1980s were done as "hostiles." A 
"hostile" refers to a takeover where the acquir�! meets resistance from the target 
company management and thus makes a tender offer directly to shareholders to buy 
their shares, typically at a premium to the then current market price. A "friendly" 
takeover occurs when the proposed acquisition is met with favor by existing manage­
ment who often intend to stay with the company after the transaction is completed, 
often in return for a significant equity stake in the business. Lobbying by labor and 
incumbent managers helped usher in the end of the «hostile" era with the passage of 
state level anti-takeover legislation in the late 1980s and 1990s. Takeovers continued 
nonetheless as buyers simply allocated larger percentages of the takeover consider­
ation to target management to motivate them to back the offers as "friendly." The 
current wave ofPE buyouts can be seen as an evolutionary response to the resistance 
to hostile transactions. 
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management to deploy new labor-saving technologies to lower costs; 
or, more likely, a combination of both. As a result of these changes, 
if all goes as planned, perhaps four years later the company might be 
valued at $750 million. PEF 1's GP may then decide to return to the 
stock market for an IPO. Ignoring for simplicity fees and interest pay­
ments, PEF I will have made a profit of $250 million after paying off 
the $400 million in debt it incurred as well as the original $100 million 
investment by the ten LPs. 
This will make the GPs very happy: the "carry" is commonly 20 
percent of the return to the fund so the GPs will walk away with $50 
million on top of their $4 million in management fees collected during 
the two-year period. Buyout funds run lean organizations so this $54 
million payday will be distributed among a handful of professionals. 
KKR, for example, has only 139 investment professionals who man­
age the investment of more than $50 billion in assets. The remaining 
80 percent of the return from the sale, or $200 million, is returned to 
the ten LPs who are presumably happy, too, assuming they don't look 
too closely at the social cost of the layoffs or plant closures imposed 
on that small town in southern Ohio in order to "turn the company 
around." The pension funds have earned a 50 percent annual return 
on their original investment, far above the expectations for their main­
stream investments in, for example, the stock of Microsoft or GE. Of 
course, that is a relatively high return exaggerated to illustrate the 
operations of buyout funds. But such returns are not unheard of or 
impossible for a single investment. Funds formed by GPs like KKR 
and Blackstone have regularly returned 20-30 percent per annum or 
more to their LPs while typical returns in the stock market are in the 
single digits." 
While PE funds may respond to a genuine and deep problem inher­
ent in the nature of the public corporation, they bring with them, how­
ever, their own peculiar set of problems, some of which may be more 
destabilizing and socially destructive than any wrought by Enron and 
its progeny. And while many on the left and in the labor mOVement may 
appear to comprehend the nature of these new funds, their perspective 
is limited by the intellectual impact today of the framework put in place 
by Berle and Means in the 1930s. Does the story that PE funds tell 
about insider mismanagement make sense? Should we welcome the PE 
buyout strategy as a necessary pill to swallow? An effective response to 
the new capitalism requires a reconsideration of the dominant Berle­
Means paradigm. 
�� Ritter, "Factoids." 
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IV The problem with the public corporation 
It is not well known today, although more recently a handful of legal 
scholars have begun to remind US,34 that Berle and Means had two aims 
with their 1932 study: to explore what they felt was the central govern­
ance problem of the public corporation as described here but also to 
situate a solution to that problem within their social democratic vision 
of governance. The former has lived on, even in the mainstream law 
and economics scholarship that dominates· much of the academic and 
policy debate about corporate behavior. But the latter has gone down 
the memory hole. 
Berle and Means argued that while the public corporation solved 
one problem for capitalism it created yet another for society at large. 
The demands of the rapid industrial growth of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries required massive amounts of capital that indi­
vidual businessmen, even if they were as wealthy as J.P. Morgan or 
Andrew Carnegie, could not provide. Sometimes this was a "push" 
process: family controlled firms began to sell off ever-larger portions of 
their firms to outside investors. Sometimes it was a "pull" process: Wall 
Street firms engineered the roll up of small family owned entities into 
larger, more efficient and, thus, profitable entities, earning sizeable fees 
in the process. The food retail giant known today as Safeway began its 
life this way when Charles Merrill (the founder of banking giant Merrill 
Lynch) engineered the merger of thousands of smaller local stores into 
a new entity that he then "took public" in 1928 through the issuance of 
shares that were soon listed on the New York Stock Exchange. For the 
first time in US history, the business of the United States was genuinely 
a public endeavor. While 4.4 million Americans owned shares in 1900 
by 1928 the number had risen to 18 million." 
The growing weight of publicly traded companies raised an alarm 
for Berle and Means. They argued that the modern corporation "has 
brought a concentration of economic power which can compete on equal 
terms with the modern state."" The potential social damage that could 
be done by the new institution was sharply highlighted by the collapse 
$4 See William W. Bratton, "BerleandMeans Reconsidered at the Century's Tum" (2001) 
26 Journal ojCorporarion Law 737; William Bratton and Michael Wachter, "Shareholder 
Primacy's Corporatist Origins: Adolf Berle and The Modern Corporation" (2008) 34 
Journal Corporation Law 99; Dalia Tsuk, "From Pluralism to Individualism: EerIe and 
Means and 20th-Century American Legal Thought" (2005) 30 Law and Social Inquiry 
179; Cynthia Williams, "The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate 
Social Transparency" (1999) 112 Harvard Law Review 1197. 
35 EerIe and Means, Corporation and Private Property, p. 56. 
% Ibid., p. 313. 
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of the capital markets in 1929. For these New Deal intellectuals this 
triggered the need for a "constitutional" approach to the governance 
of the corporation that would re-generate legitimacy to the decision­
making processes of what was to them as much a socio-political institu­
tion as an economic one. 
Driving this political approach was their insight into the inherent 
problem of the corporation: that it was plagued, as suggested here, by 
a fundamental separation of ownership and control. Smith and Marx, 
among others, had mentioned this issue in passing but in eras when the 
"joint stock" company, as it was largely known in the nineteenth cen­
tury, had nowhere near the importance it took on by the early twentieth. 
Since Berle and Means viewed that separation as a permanent and ser­
ious disability, it required a new doctrinal approach to corporate law. In 
fact, their argument presented a deep challenge to then-dominant free 
market liberalism: if the corporate form contained within it two com­
peting interest groups, managers and investors, then this tore asunder 
the notion of a civil society of competing individual businesspersons 
with clear and unambiguous property rights to their business assets 
generating efficient, and socio-politically legitimate, outcomes through 
arm's-length trading in the marketplace. The emergence of the modern 
publicly traded corporation, then, arguably triggered a larger crisis in 
political theory. 
As they wrote in 1932: 
The separation of ownership from control produces a condition where the inter­
ests of owner and of ultimate manager may, and often do, diverge and where 
many of the checks which formerly operated to limit the use of power disappear 
... New responsibilities towards the owners, the workers, the consumers and 
the State thus rest upon the shoulders of those in control. In creating these new 
relationships, the quasi-public corporation may fairly be said to work a revolu­
tion. It has destroyed the unity that we commonly call property - has divided 
ownership into nominal ownership and the power formerly joined to it. Thereby 
the corporation has changed the nature of profit-seeking enterpriseY 
To help solve this problem - and to do so within the boundaries of 
some form of "capitalism" the authors looked to the already estab­
lished law of trusts to argue that corporate managers, those who "con­
trolled" the corporation, had to behave with as much rectitude on 
behalf of outside shareholders, the "owners" of the corporation, as the 
trustees of a trust fund did for the beneficiaries of the trust. As then 
Judge, and later Justice, Benjamin Cardozo wrote in a widely cited 1928 
opinion issued just as Berle and Means were conducting their initial 
37 Ibid., p. 7. 
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research: "A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the 
marketplace. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the most 
sensitive is the standard of behavior."" This approach proved too much 
for most New Deal era politicians who backed away from the most radi­
cal proposals coming out of FOR's brain trust, but the federal secur­
ities laws put in place then, including the Investment Company Act, 
which regulates private equity funds, did create new forms of oversight 
of corporations and financial institutions that remain in place today, if 
in muted form .. 
Today's agency school 
While Berle and Means' more radical vision of the corporation as a 
social entity did not survive, their image of the conflict between inside 
managers and outside investors is imprinted in the psyche of every busi­
ness and law school graduate in the United States. It is widely believed 
that most of our corporate law and financial structures are aimed at 
solving the problems that result from this conflict. Today, they are 
known as "agency problems" - with inside managers of the public cor­
poration cast as "agents" of the outside shareholders, or "principals." 
There are costs associated with this principal-agency relationship 
known as "agency costS."39 
These agency costs include the time and money that principals must 
spend to negotiate contractual protections with agents and to monitor 
the agents during the life of the contract. If the contractual terms are 
violated or the contract proves, as is often the case, incomplete, fur­
ther costs will be incurred by the need to engage in ex post gap-filling 
through dispute resolution or judicial or legislative intervention. Some 
theorists of the agency school go so far as to suggest that the corpor­
ation itself is merely a "nexus of contracts" between all of the suppliers 
and purchasers of corporate inputs and outputs, right up to the CEO's 
office where a "labor market" sets the price and terms under which 
senior corporate personnel will work. The advantage of this view is that 
it appears to solve the legitimacy problem that the Berle and Means 
argument highlighted because it finds a way to insert the market mech­
anism back into the corporate structure.40 
38 Meinhardv. Salmon, 164 N.B. 545 (N.Y. 1928) (Cardozo, Ch. J.). 
39 On agency costS, see the classic statement by Michael Jensen and Wi1li�m Mecklin�� 
"Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and OwnershIp Structure 
(1976) 3 Journal of Financial Economics 305-360. 
40 A good summary can be found in Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of the Law (New 
York: Aspen, 1977). 
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Together, these agency costs add to the cost of capital and thus to 
the cost of "doing business." But, agency theorists argue, if laws and 
�ontracts are efficiently designed, these costs can be minimized, and, 
ill fact, the resulting predictability can make investing in such an envir­
onment more attractive. Thus, in today's debate about competition 
between national financial markets such as London and New York, 
some argue that the higher cost of regulation in the US markets is, 
ultimately, worth paying; while others argue that the mix of legal inter­
vention and private ordering through contractual arrangements has 
gone awry with post-Enron reforms such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
raising the costs of managing a public corporation in the United States 
to an intolerable level. 
But what if you could design a corporate or financial structure that 
would eliminate so-called "agency costs"? The result would be truly 
revolutionary: potentially, at least, it could mean the elimination, or at 
least dramatic minimization, of costly contractual negotiations over the 
complex relationships that exist today among senior corporate manage­
ment, boards of directors, Wall Street financial analysts, individual and 
institutional investors and government regulators. Enron, WorldCom, 
Tyco - all are considered examples of the problems that arise when 
agency problems are not adequately resolved. 
This is, in part, the justification used to form private equity funds -
they hold out the promise of eliminating the modern corporation's 
agency problems by concentrating ownership and control in a single 
institution. Voila! A problem that has plagued Anglo-American cap­
italism for more than a century might just disappear. Interestingly, 
continental European and Asian capital has largely avoided this issue 
by continuing to rely on state, family or closely networked ownership 
forms. However, they have also, it can be argued, lost the opportun­
ity to take the kinds of risks that the use of "other people's money" 
allows one to take with the public corporate form. Nonetheless, pri­
vate equity is aggressively entering those markets as well with an 
agenda that is similar to that found in the United States and the 
United Kingdom. 
V The labor-left counter-attack 
Trade unions have an ambivalent attitude toward the rise of private 
equity. On the one hand, many US labor unions have representatives 
on the boards of the same pension funds that are largely responsible 
for the steady flow of capital into PE funds and, of course, that means 
some union members have benefited handsomely from the funds' above 
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average returns.4! On the other hand, over the last decade organized 
labor has developed a relatively sophisticated program of investor activ­
ism through the Office of Investment at the AFL-CIO, the Capital 
Strategies Group of Change to Win and similar groups at key union 
affiliates. This effort relies on labor's pension fund investments in pub­
lic companies to raise concerns about corporate social responsibility, 
excessive CEO pay, workers' rights and internal corporate governance. 
But labor does not seem to have made up its mind whether Or not PE 
funds raise or lower corporate standards of behavior. When it was clear 
in spring of 2007 that German auto giant Daimler was looking to sell 
off its troubled Chrysler division, United Auto Workers union presi­
dent Ron Gettelfinger said he would oppose a PE bid for the company 
because such an investor would "strip and flip" the company.42 A few 
weeks later, after a meeting with Cerberus Capital, which had by then 
announced a deal with Daimler, Gettelfinger sang a completely new 
rune. Without any internal discussion, debate or vote by the UAW mem­
bership at Chrysler, he announced that the takeover bid by Cerberus 
Capital for the car company ''was in the best interest of our member­
ship, the Chrysler Group and Daimler."" Reacting to Gettelfinger's 
endorsement of the deal, Canadian Auto Workers union leader Buzz 
Hargrove initially told the New York Times "the history of private equity 
has been to buy, then slash and burn a lot of jobs, and then get out 
with a lot money for a handful of people."44 But in very short order, 
after a meeting with Cerberus Capital's CEO, Hargrove too reversed 
course, telling reporters, according to Edwards Auto Observer, "he was 
convinced Cerberus was 'not about slice and dice ... they're in it for the 
long term."'" The New York Times reported that Chrysler rank and file 
workers expressed surprise and confusion at the change in tune from 
union leaders}' Some Canadian labor groups have gone even further 
than verbal endorsements of PE deals. The Ontario Teachers Pension 
41 Michael J. de la Merced and Peter Edmonston, "Cerberus Goes Where No Firm 
Has Gone Before," The New York Times, May 15, 2007 ("Big pension funds of public 
employees like Calpers are among the biggest institutional investors in private equity 
firms, and public pension money accounted for about a quarter of all new money 
raised by private equity last year"). 
42 Kevin Krolicki and Poornima Gupta, "UAW Presses Daimler to Cal1 Off Chrysler 
Sale," Reuters, April 18, 2007. 
43 Michelle Krebs, "Cerberus Charms Chrysler's Unions," Edmunds Auto Observer.com, 
May 16, 2007. 
44 Nick Bunkley, "Chrysler Workers Surprised After Union Backs Sale," The New Yorl� 
Times, May 15, 2007. 
45 Krebs, "Cerebus Charms." 
46 Bunkley, "Chrysler Workers Surprised." 
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Fund has its own PE arm and engineered a bid to buy out Bell Canada 
in 2007, only to find the deal first delayed and then fall apart altogether 
in the face of the credit crisis. 
The leadership of Unite Here!, an amalgam of unions representing 
hotel, restaurant and clothing industry workers, was effusive in its praise 
for the multi-billion dollar biCl by Blackstone for Hilton Hotels, stating 
in a press release issued as soon as the deal was announced that it "wel­
comed" the transaction contending "Blackstone has demonstrated its 
commitment to fair treatment for thousands of hotel workers."'17 But when 
Blackstone announced its intention to sell shares to public investors in an 
IPO, the AFL-CIO and SEW, though nOt working together, each criti­
cized the transaction. The AFL-CIO wrote to the SEC in a call for the 
enforcement of the governance requirements of the Investment Company 
Act against Blackstone. Both labor groups began campaigning to raise tax 
rates on PE partners' income from the carried interest in their funds.48 
Unlike North American unions, European labor has been largely 
united in a campaign against private equity. In a 2007 report entitled 
"Private Equity'S Broken Promises," the Central Executive Committee 
of the UK's GMB, the century old general workers union with more 
than 600,000 members, blasted PE funds}' The report lists dozens of 
examples of British companies taken over by PE funds using debt to 
replace equity followed by layoffs and then exit transactions that led to 
huge paydays for the partners and investors in the funds. In 2004 the 
"AA," the British automobile insurance .and roadside protection asso­
ciation, was bought from its corporate parent by buyout funds CVC 
Capital and Permira. The GMB had voted AA Employer of the Year in 
2003, but under PE ownership one-third of its workforce was laid off 
with disabled workers apparently a particular target, wages were cut, 
the workday at call centers was increased from 8 to 11.75 hours, and the 
GMB was forced out and replaced by a company union. Meanwhile, 
the company took on close to 2 billion dollars of new debt and paid 
Permira and CVC a special dividend of nearly a billion dollars. 
A second report issued by the Geneva based IUF, the international 
trade union body that represents 12 million workers in 336 unions in the 
47 "Hotel Workers Union Applauds Blackstone-Hilton Combination," Unite Here! 
Press Release, PR News, July 3, 2007. 
48 AFL-CIO, Statement for the Record, United States Senate Committee on Finance 
Hearing on Carried Interest Part III: Pension Issues, September 6, 2007 ("the AFL� 
CIO sees no valid justificati0r: for the individuals who manage private equity, real 
estate, and hedge funds to receIVe tax subsidies that leave the burden of paying ordin­
ary tax rates to working people"). 
49 GMB, "Private Equity's Broken Pension Promises" (2007). 
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food, farm and hotel sectors around the world, highlighted the impact 
of debt financing by PE groups.50 The report noted that while public 
companies may have a debt to equity ratio of 1:10, once bought out by 
a PE fund that ratio is often reversed. Frequently, PE funds then cause 
the companies they take over to take on additional debt in order to 
pay out a dividend to their investors because an exit opportunity seems 
too far away. In a presentation to British Labour Party MPs the IUF's 
Director of Communications, Peter Rossman, noted that KKR and 
Carlyle shared in a $250 million dividend only a month after closing on 
the $4 billion debt financed buyout of satellite operator PanAmSat.51 
The Trade Union Advisory Committee (TUAC ) to the OECD joined 
in the European campaign, noting in a report last spring that "the high 
rates of return required to finance private equity debt-driven buy-outs 
can jeopardize target companies' long-term interests and provision of 
decent employment conditions and security for employees." The TUAC 
called for regulatory reform of tax rates, corporate governance, trans­
parency, risk management and workers' rights. 52 
"Financialization�' or pluralism redux? 
The focus by unions on the role of debt in PE-led deals is critical but 
the impact of debt on the governance of a firm is not well understood. 
For several years, labor and left-wing critics of globalization have pro­
moted the concept of "financialization" as a leading symptom of the 
post-Cold War capitalist economy. The late Marxist economist Paul 
Sweezy argued in Monthly Review that by the end of the 1980s the 
world economy "had given way to a new structure in which a greatly 
expanded financial sector had achieved a high degree of independence 
and sat on top of the underlying production system."" Robin Blackburn, a 
socialist, took a similar approach recently in the New Left Review where 
he wrote: "It is not household names like Nike or Coca-Cola that are 
the capstones of contemporary capitalism, but finance houses, hedge 
so International Union of Food, Agricultural" Hotel, Restaurant, Caterin& Tobacco 
and Allied Workers' Associations (IUF), A Workers' Guide to Private Equity Buyouts 
(2007). 
51 Peter Rossman, Presentation to Trade Union Sponsored Labour MPs on Private 
Equity and Leveraged Buyouts, February 27, 2007. 
52 Trade Union Advisory Committee to the Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, "Growth With Equity," Trade Union Statement to the OECD 
Ministerial Council Meeting, May 15-16, 2007, at p. 9. 
53 Paul M. Sweezy, "Economic Reminiscences" (May 1995) 47:1 Monthly Review 8-9, 
cited in John Bellamy Foster, "The Financialization of Capitalism" (April 2007) 
58:11 Monthly Review (emphasis added). 
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f unds and private equity concerns, many of which are unknown to the 
general public. In the end even the largest and most famous of corpora­
tions have only a precarious and provisional autonomy within the new 
world of business - ultimately they are playthings of the capital markets."" 
The IUF's Rossman calls "financialized . capital" "extremely impa­
tient," "volatile, highly mobile, and linked to a variety of new financial 
instruments based on debt." In an article for the ILO's journal Labour 
Education Rossman and his IUF colleague Gerard Greenfield defined 
"financialization" as "both the enhanced importance of financial ver­
sus real capital in determining the rhythm and returns expected from 
investments, and the increased subordination of that investment to the 
demands of global financial markets."" 
As should be clear, each of these analysts, although they come from 
different political traditions, defines the current capitalist period as one 
in which finance dominates the so-called "real economy." This would 
appear to be a relatively simple reprise of the longstanding populist view 
that what all too often plagues what would be an otherwise healthy cap­
italism is a tension between, on the one hand, the interests of ({real," 
('productive" capitalists who roll up their sleeves and build companies 
and, on the other, those who merely "speculate" using financial assets 
like so many chips in a casino. As such, this view is, in fact, a restate­
ment of the original Berle-Means paradigm of the separation of owner­
ship and control, only in reverse. 
Berle and Means were working in a period when it was widely believed 
that corporate managers had triumphed over the financial markets. 
Keynes famously spoke favorably in his General Theory published in 
1936 of the potential for the "euthanasia of the rentier, of the function­
less investor."56 In Stalin's Russia, that policy was in fact carried out with 
unparalleled brutality. Berle and Means' book was followed in 1941 by 
James Burnham's hugely popular The Managerial Revolution that caught 
the mood of the day when it argued that the United States, Germany 
and Russia were all suffering from the imminent global triumph of a 
new bureaucratic post-capitalist class. 57 In this intellectual and political 
milieu it was nOt a surprise that Berle and Means compared the new 
54 Robin Blackburn, "Finance and the Fourth Dimension" (May-June 2006) 39 New 
Left Review 42 (emphasis added). 
55 Peter Rossman and Gerard Greenfield, "Financialization: New Routes to Profit, New 
Challenges for Trade Unions" Qanuary 2006) 142 Labour Education 55. 
56 John Maynard Keynes, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (New 
. York: Harcourt Brace, 1936). 
57 James Burnham, The Managerial Revolution (orig. 1941) (Westport: Greenwood 
Press, 1972). 
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boards of directors of public corporations to "a communist committee 
of commissars" and cast the corporate director as someone who ((more 
nearly resembles the communist in mode of thought than he does the 
protagonist of private property."" Nor was it shocking for Gardiner 
Means to write of a new "collective" capitalism emerging in the United 
States. 59 Berle and Means' work was critical because it described a 
method by which these managers appeared to have triumphed from 
within capitalism itself aided by a newly expanded Wall Street appar­
atus oflawyers, bankers and brokers, leaving the corporate entity in the 
hands of technocrats. 
As it turned out, of course, Berle and Means were wrong, as were 
Burnham and Keynes. Capitalism was not morphing somehow into a 
Stalinist post-capitalist nightmare. It was true that the capital markets 
took many years to recover from the trauma of 1929 and to learn how to 
function within the new regulatory framework that New Deal legisla­
tion imposed on the economy. But the capital markets never disappeared 
and neither did competition within the modern capitalist economy. As 
recent research by Barry Holderness concludes, Berle and Means, in 
fact, radically overstated the number of companies with powerless dis­
persed shareholders.60 Many publicly held US businesses retain sizeable 
shareholders with "control blocks" that enable them to influence man­
agerial decision-making.6l Thus, most takeovers of public companies 
are friendly transactions, with existing management induced in various 
ways to agree to the acquisition. Indeed, to day's PE funds often are able 
to engage in soft landing takeovers with handsome premiums paid to 
shareholders as well, who are then free to redeploy their capital in other 
parts of the economy. 
In other words, it may have looked as if outside investors had no 
weight inside the corporate boardroom, but to have written offthat pos­
sibility altogether would have meant to argue that competition itself was 
no longer operating inside the US economy. No matter how much influ­
ence government regolation or spending may have had at the height of 
the Cold War, US corporations continued to compete with each other, 
often bitterly, in capital, labor and product markets. New companies 
58 Berle and Means, Corporation and Private Property, p. 245. 
59 Gardiner Means, The Corporate Revolution in America: Economic Reality 'Os Economic 
Theory (New York: Crowell-Collier Press, 1962). 
60 Holderness, "Myth of Diffuse Ownership," p. 1377 ("Although BerIe and Means 
offer considerable empirical evidence, upon close examination their evidence is not as 
supportive of diffuse ownership as is often believed"). I am grateful to Henry Manne 
for bringing the work of Holderness to my attention. 
61 Ibid. ("The ownership of U.S. :firms is similar to and by some measures more concen­
trated than the ownership of firms in other countries.") 
Beyond the BerIe and Means paradigm 173 
were formed, financed by Wall Street and prospered; other older com­
panies faltered, lost support in the financial markets and went out of 
business. Workers fought for and organized unions, engaged in col­
lective actions and pushed for higher wages, sometimes successfully, in 
other cases unsuccessfully. 
But if in their assessment of reality Berle and Means had failed, on 
the ideological front they succeeded in helping to redraw the frame­
work within which US capitalism was understood. An emerging real 
world battleground in the 1930s where, on the one hand, managerial 
and financial capitalists together were pitted against, on the other hand, 
a militant new labor movement with ideas about radical reorganiza­
tion of economic activity, was recast as a need to (socially) democratize 
the principles that governed the behavior of the new managerial class. 
This technocratic analysis became the basis of the dominant postwar 
ideology of industrial pluralism, with interest groups competing in the 
"space" left open between giant business and labor organizations.62 It is 
a similar Cold War pluralist ideology that is used by SOme in US labor 
and business groups today to promote "constructive engagement" with 
an authoritarian regime like that of China, arguing that a new "space" 
is being opened up by the regime's market reforms. In fact, there is even 
less space there for a genuine labor movement than there was, or is, in 
a United States dominated by the ever-evolving alliance of managerial 
and financial capitalists. 
Thus, the left - from socialist to social democratic - was completely 
unprepared intellectually for the restructuring of US capitalism under­
way over the last twenty years. Its thinkers remained, and largely remain, 
compelled by the apparent progressive promise of the liberal pluralist 
ideology that took hold as earlier labor militancy was beaten back by 
war, repression and new legal structures such as the Taft-Hartley Act 
of 1947. The reCent capitalist restructuring has included downsizing, 
outsourcing and dramatic technological change alongside growth in 
the financial markets. The attempt to cast these recent developments 
as just the "financialization" of capitalism is a non sequitur. This view 
ignores what capitalists actually do. Instead, whether or not consciously, 
it gives credence to a populist argument that focuses on apparent power 
shifts within the economy - and, of course, a focus on "power" is part 
62 Among those legal scholars with a revived interest in Berle and Means, Tsuk focuses 
most closely on the pluralist dimension of their work but without discussing the wider 
context of class conflict and only a limited concern with the influence of Stalinist and 
fascist elements in the New Deal itself. Normatively, Tsuk laments the defeat of the 
"lasting meaning" of Berle and Means' concern with corporate power by the law and 
economics school, which may explain her focus. See Tsuk, "Pluralism." 
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and parcel of a pluralist worldview. We are not in a corporatist world 
of interest groups competing for power, but in a world where owners of 
capital employ highly specialized managers, who also have an oppor­
tunity to become owners of capital, to generate and appropriate value 
in production.63 W here workers organize, economically and politically, 
they must do so in opposition to the organizational intent of both those 
managers and financiers, who share a mutual interest in the continu­
ing dynamic of restructuring.64 This is the very heart of the capitalist 
process - in China as well as in the United States, as true in 2010 as in 
1932. 
VI Conclusion: the real nature of private equity 
It is particularly inapt to cast private equity funds as a form of "finan­
cialization" of capitalism. Private equity actually concentrates in a new 
institutional form the resources and abilities of investors together with 
the on-the-ground knowledge of managers. While it is true that PE 
funds rely heavily on debt and other financial instruments to engage in 
ever larger deals and magnify their returns, their success in this effort 
depends on very careful attention to the details of how to operate the 
targeted businesses so that the financial instruments used to take over 
control are appropriate to the task. 
Thus, some may properly criticize the new CEO of Chrysler, Robert 
Nardelli, for his outsized pay packages while overseeing a decline in 
profitability at his previous company, Home Depot. But to ignore his 
deep understanding of the production process would be foolish - prior 
to joining Home Depot, where, of course, he picked up a first class 
education in the consumer goods segment of the economy, he ran the 
highly respected locomotive production operations of GE. And the 
debt instruments used in PE-led deals actually embody in a detailed set 
of heavily negotiated contracts the terms of a complex new social rela­
tionship between investors, PE fund managers, investment bankers and 
managers of the target companies. 
Thus, the PE fund must have within it a concentration of very spe­
cialized talent to coordinate the takeover process and access to and 
6:> See Dan Krier, Speculative Management: Srock Market Power and Corporate Change 
(Albany: State University of New York, 2005). 
64 The ever-present problem at the heart of capitalism is the tension between increases 
in productivity on a social scale and the heteronomic ownership structure of individ­
ual business units. Thus, managers (financial and production based) must constantly 
face the readjustment of their cost and profit estimates as new technology undermines 
yesterday's assumptions. 
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relationships with senior managerial talent in a range of industries. The 
partners of PE funds also tend to have backgrounds in the financial 
markets and are very sensitive to the concerns of the professionals who 
invest on behalf of large institutions such as pension funds. In turn _ 
and this is crucial - today's buyouts, as I suggested, are largely friendly 
transactions where the buyout fund plans to work closely with exist­
ing management because the PE fund parmers know these executives 
have crucial inside knowledge about the target firm. A clear example 
of this is the Cerberus buyout of Chrysler: the new owners announced 
their intention to keep Thomas LaSorda on board as president because 
he was thought to have a good relationship with the leadership of the 
UAW.65 Because significant concessions from the UAW were and will 
continue to be a major goal of the buyout that relationship would be 
highly valued both by Cerberus and by the investors in the billions 
in debt needed to carry out the transaction. In addition, the buyouts 
are friendly with respect to the major shareholders who dominate US 
corporations. Rather than riding to the rescue of helpless dispersed 
shareholders, then, PE funds must engage skillfully the complex alli­
ance between managerial and operational employees, on the one hand, 
and the large institutional investors like pension funds and hedge funds 
that together own today's public corporations. 
We are not witnessing in the early twenty-first century some kind of 
coup d'etat by "finance" against the "real" economy, any more than the 
agency problems of the publicly traded corporation meant that a new 
class of managers took power in the mid-twentieth century. The rise of 
some widely traded public corporations in the era of Berle and Means 
should, instead, have been seen as a successful effort to marry finan­
cial resources with managerial talent in a new capitalist form. But even 
then many large companies retained concentrated ownership among a 
few large shareholders. Today, we might be wimessing what Harvard 
Business School's Michael Jensen predicted in 1989 would be the 
"eclipse of the public corporation."" But perhaps that should read the 
"eclipse of those still remaining widely traded public corporations." 
Private equity led buyouts represent an evolution in the effort by a 
significant fraction of sophisticated players in the economy to forge 
new methods of managing and controlling the process of creating and 
65 Micheline Maynard, "Latest Chrysler Twist Adds Mystery to LaSorda's Fate," New 
York Times, September 6, 2007 ("Mr. LaSorda is overseeing Chrysler's negotiations 
with the United Automobile Workers union, familiar territory for him, since his father 
and grandfather were officials of the Canadian Auto Workers"). 
66 Michael C. Jensen, "The Eclipse of the Public Corporation" (September-October 
1989) 67 Harvard Business Review (revised 1997). 
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apprQpriating value frQm the labQr fQrce Qn behalf Qf investQrs. By
 CQn­
centrating expertise in finance with operational know-h.ow, It 18 po
ssIble 
that the ability Qf capital to. engineer greater returns wIll be enhan
ced. 
To. recQgnize the magnitude Qf the accQmplishment Qf PE fun�s 
IS nQt 
to. SUPPQrt, nQrmatively, the result. Instead it helps to hIghlIght th
e 
challenge fQr labQr and the left. Private equity funds are dQmg w
hat 
capital has always dQne and will cQntinue to. do. unless an .al
ternatlve 
fQrm Qf Qrganizing eCQnQmic activity IS establIshed. A mIsgUIded.PQP
u­
list fear of "financialization" does not bring us any closer to begmn
Ing 
the explQratiQn Qf that alternative. 
---- �-�- � - � -----�----------------
9 Pension funds as owners and as 
financial intermediaries: a review of 
recent Canadian experience 
Simon Archer 
I Acting like Qwners? 
In the spring Qf 2007, a venerable Canadian cQrpQratiQn, Bell Canada 
Enterprises (BCE), became an acquisitiQn target, and an acquisitiQn 
agreement was subsequently signed. Until the deal was unwQund Qn a 
technical valuatiQn clause, it was the biggest prQPQsed leveraged bUYQut 
in Canadian histQry: it was big news. SQme Qf the features Qf this tranS­
actiQn were the size and nature Qf the target (fQrmerly a regulated mQn­
QPQly) and the identity Qf the primary purchaser, Ontario. Teachers' 
PensiQn Plan (OTPP, an QccupatiQnal pensiQn plan fQr elementary and 
secQndary schQQl teachers). It might nQt have attracted much mQre 
attentiQn - pensiQn funds had been purchasing and cQntrQlling CQm­
panies in Canada fQr a decade Qr mQre - but then in August 2007, 
abQut two. mQnths after the deal was made, the Canadian and then glQ­
bal credit markets seized up, and the General Financial Crisis (GFC), 
as it has CQme to. be knQwn, ensued. AbQut a year later, the deal was 
unwQund, but Qnly after the bQndhQlders Qf BCE visited the Supreme 
CQurt Qf Canada cQmplaining Qf their treatment thrQugh the whQle 
process.1 
FQrgQtten nQW are SQme Qf the mQre curiQus lQcal aspects Qf this 
deal: OTPP (Qr any Qther pensiQn fund) was prQhibited frQm Qwning 
BCE - at least Qn paper - by Ontario. pensiQn legislatiQn. The CEO Qf 
OTPP, a public sectQr uniQn pensiQn plan, publicly mused that it may 
restructure BCE, which implied tackling the uniQnized BCE emplQyees. 
Indeed, it was said anecdQtally that OTPP had a PQlicy Qf nQt invest­
ing in businesses that sPQnsQred defined benefit pensiQn schemes - Qf 
which OTPP was Qne Qf the biggest in Canada. CQntrary to. past prac­
tice, in this deal, a major Canadian pension fund sought to own a local 
1 BeE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders [2008] 3 SCR 560. The bondholders lost and so the 
transaction could have gone forward but the deal collapsed when a valuation term 
could not be met in the midst of the GFC. 
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